Subgame perfect equilibrium

Results: 125



#Item
21A COGNITIVE HIERARCHY MODEL OF GAMES1  Colin F. Camerer Teck-Hua Ho

A COGNITIVE HIERARCHY MODEL OF GAMES1 Colin F. Camerer Teck-Hua Ho

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Source URL: people.hss.caltech.edu

Language: English - Date: 2004-02-24 15:32:28
22Timing and Virtual Observability in Ultimatum Bargaining and “Weak Link” Coordination Games Roberto A. Weber* Department of Social and Decision Sciences Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh PA 15213

Timing and Virtual Observability in Ultimatum Bargaining and “Weak Link” Coordination Games Roberto A. Weber* Department of Social and Decision Sciences Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh PA 15213

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Source URL: people.hss.caltech.edu

Language: English - Date: 2003-05-01 11:34:36
23Extensive-Form Solution Concepts  Page 1 Extensive-Form Solution Concepts

Extensive-Form Solution Concepts Page 1 Extensive-Form Solution Concepts

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Source URL: www.virtualperfection.com

Language: English - Date: 2010-04-18 23:59:19
24Repeated Games  Page 1 Repeated Games

Repeated Games Page 1 Repeated Games

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Source URL: www.virtualperfection.com

Language: English - Date: 2010-04-18 23:59:20
25SS 201b, Homework 1 Due Tuesday, January 12th Collaboration on homework is encouraged, but individually written solutions are required. Please name all collaborators and sources of information on each assignment. Any suc

SS 201b, Homework 1 Due Tuesday, January 12th Collaboration on homework is encouraged, but individually written solutions are required. Please name all collaborators and sources of information on each assignment. Any suc

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Source URL: people.hss.caltech.edu

Language: English - Date: 2016-06-13 13:31:38
26Whither Game Theory? Drew Fudenberg† ∗  David K. Levine‡

Whither Game Theory? Drew Fudenberg† ∗ David K. Levine‡

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Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu

Language: English - Date: 2016-03-12 03:25:53
27Leadership with Commitment to Mixed Strategies∗ Bernhard von Stengel Department of Mathematics, London School of Economics, Houghton St, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom email:

Leadership with Commitment to Mixed Strategies∗ Bernhard von Stengel Department of Mathematics, London School of Economics, Houghton St, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom email:

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Source URL: www.cdam.lse.ac.uk

Language: English - Date: 2004-08-30 10:00:02
28SS 201b Syllabus (1) Extensive form games with perfect information. • Equilibria. • Zermelo’s Theorem. • The one deviation principle. • Backward induction.

SS 201b Syllabus (1) Extensive form games with perfect information. • Equilibria. • Zermelo’s Theorem. • The one deviation principle. • Backward induction.

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Source URL: people.hss.caltech.edu

Language: English - Date: 2016-06-13 13:31:44
29Solving Imperfect Information Games Using Decomposition Neil Burch, Michael Johanson and Michael Bowling Computing Science Department, University of Alberta {nburch,johanson,mbowling}@ualberta.ca  Abstract

Solving Imperfect Information Games Using Decomposition Neil Burch, Michael Johanson and Michael Bowling Computing Science Department, University of Alberta {nburch,johanson,mbowling}@ualberta.ca Abstract

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Source URL: poker.cs.ualberta.ca

Language: English - Date: 2014-06-09 17:40:22
30Centralizing information in networks

Centralizing information in networks

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Source URL: www.jeanne-hagenbach.fr

Language: English - Date: 2010-09-21 19:30:53